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Chapter 5
Privacy at the Next Level: 
Intel’s Enhanced Privacy 
Identification (EPID) 
Technology
The fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute 
a greater danger to the privacy of the individual.
—Earl Warren, 14th Chief Justice of the United States
You’ve probably clicked the “I agree” button hundreds of times on privacy policy 
statements of service providers’ web sites, from Gmail to Netflix, from Amazon to your 
favorite game apps. Most people simply want to enjoy the service or access contents 
as soon as possible, and thus do not bother to read through the privacy policy from 
beginning to end before giving consent. Many times, people are willing to share their 
private information with the service providing site/server, and they rely on the vendors’ 
good faith to protect their privacy and not share with third parties.
To build the infrastructure for protecting the privacy of Intel’s consumers, Intel 
invented the enhanced privacy identification (EPID) technology, which is implemented 
by the security and management engine on big core and systems-on-chip platforms for 
servers, desktops, laptops, tablets, and smartphones.
Redefining Privacy for the Mobile Age
Service providers normally promise some level of protection in their privacy policy 
agreements, such as not selling or renting out your personal information (name, gender, 
date of birth, mailing address, e-mail address, and so forth). At the same time, in 
exchange for the free or paid services, consumers likely have to allow service providers to 
archive your activities and push customized marketing correspondence to your mailbox. 
It may be useful information to you, or, most of the time, may be treated as spam. Notice 
that privacy policies and options provided to users are often subject to change. New 
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options that have defaults as not private may be introduced. This puts even the paranoid 
users at a loss by having to keep up with each new feature update. In addition, it is not 
surprising that the Google Ads on the websites you browse are promoting products you 
recently showed interest in. Service providers have good incentives to make the most out 
of your private information. Monetization of user data is big business and a significant 
revenue source for many providers, especially social networking websites and apps.
The mobile computing age brings with it increasing risks to users’ privacy. There 
are hundreds of thousands of mobile apps out there, and counting. If you are paying 
attention to the list of privileges that an app asks for before installation, you will find 
many require access to data stored on your device, such as personal information, your 
phone book, call history, text messages, and so forth. A paranoid user may wonder, 
“Hmm, why does this music app need to access my phone book?” and exit installation. 
But many do not bother to question. Hence, privacy is at risk.
What is the ultimate and true privacy? The nuanced answer depends on an 
individual’s expectation, which varies based on factors such as type of data, social 
context, culture, and so on.
A simple answer, however, is anonymity. In a perfect world of anonymity, there is no 
identification. Everyone appears identical. In terms of computer privacy, anonymity can 
be realized in two ways: passively and actively.
Passive Anonymity
Imagine that an online movie service does not save the list of the contents you have 
watched, because you do not want others to know what kinds of movies you favor; 
imagine that a prescription medicine reseller does not record the history of your 
purchases, because you don’t want to expose your health information. This is passive 
anonymity. The realization of such anonymity completely or partially relies on the 
attitude of the parties you are dealing with. If the movie service wants, it can save the 
list of titles you have streamed, and even details such as where in the titles you paused 
or fast-forwarded. Similarly, an online medicine vendor could derive, without much 
difficulty, what diseases you are suffering by examining the prescriptions you ordered.
One may argue that what types of movies a person likes is not something really 
secretive. However, no one knows whether such data, seemingly harmless today, could 
be used against you in the future. In information security, the principle of least privilege 
requires that an entity must be able to access only the information and resources that are 
necessary for its legitimate purpose. When talking about privacy, least privilege of the 
service provider is always the best interest to consumers.
An important point in the privacy discussion is the user’s expectation, which varies 
by context. For example, an end user may be okay with sharing the list of movies he has 
watched with his personal friends on social networks, but not with his work colleagues. 
Sometimes the user may want to watch some movies privately without anyone else knowing.
Practically, end users cannot rely on the service providers’ good faith to protect 
their privacy. The bottom line is that users’ privacy is not in the providers’ interest—and 
may even be against their interest. And even the definition of “privacy” is often up to the 
providers’ discretion. You may choose to believe that some big names are not evil, but 
you simply cannot trust everyone. The privacy commitment had better be enforced by 
technology, and not human beings. This is active anonymity.
Chapter 5 ■ privaCy at the Next LeveL: iNteL’s eNhaNCed privaCy ideNtifiCatioN (epid) teChNoLogy
119
Note ■  passive anonymity relies on human beings for enforcement.
Active Anonymity
In contrast to passive anonymity, active anonymity does not depend on human beings for 
enforcement. The anonymity is natively built in the technology.
Note ■  active anonymity relies on technology for enforcement.
There are two fundamental and functional problems to resolve by an active 
anonymous authentication technology:
•	 Authentication: The user must prove to the service provider that 
the user is eligible to receive the service. Eligibility is established 
by showing that the user is a member of a group that is granted 
access to the specific service. There are various different criteria 
for becoming a member of the group—for example, possessing 
a specific hardware device or paying a service fee. The criteria of 
becoming a group member are defined by the service provider.
•	 Anonymity: The service provider must not be able to trace the 
user. The key words here are not be able to rather than do not. In 
other words, even if the service provider wants to identify a user, 
it should not be possible to. The user only has to show that he/she 
belongs to the group of eligible users, without revealing identity. 
Since all users in the group are allowed to receive the service, this 
user’s request should be fulfilled after being authenticated. The 
technology must be designed to disable the service provider from 
possibly distinguishing any individual users from any other users 
in the same group. Furthermore, the technology must provide an 
option to the user so that the service provider cannot tell whether 
or not two or more service requests were originated from the 
same user.
How to achieve these two goals of anonymous authentication? A straightforward 
approach is to have all users that belong to the same group share the same credential for 
authentication. It is a feasible solution, and is in fact being used by many mobile products 
in the market today. But is it good enough?
The problems of this credential-sharing design are as obvious as its simplicity. 
Once any device is successfully compromised by attackers, and credentials are leaked, 
the security of the entire authentication system of the service provider is broken, 
and all devices with the same credential are impacted. This is a typical break-once-
run-everywhere (BORE) scenario. Dealing with the aftermath is very expensive and 
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cumbersome. To mitigate BORE, besides the two basic goals of authentication and 
anonymity, there is a third desired characteristic:
•	 Revocation: The technology must provide the means to revoke a 
select member of a group or the entire group in order to terminate 
services for only the select user or group without impacting 
nonrevoked members and groups. The reasons for revocation are 
determined by the providers. It could be a user’s violation of the 
service agreement or loss or compromise of credential.
Processor Serial Number 
Flashing back to 1999, Intel’s Pentium III processor introduced a new feature, known as 
the processor serial number or PSN. The serial number is a 64-bit string programmed to 
processor hardware during the manufacturing process. The serial number of a processor 
is unique to the processor. It cannot be changed or erased during the lifetime of the 
processor. When the read permission is turned on, software can retrieve the PSN value 
by simply issuing a CPUID instruction. Note that the CPUID instruction returns other 
information, such as processor type and the presence of processor features, in addition to 
the PSN.
The read permission of the PSN can be enabled or disabled through one of two 
methods, as described next. The goal of restricting read permission is to make sure that the 
owner of the platform is aware when the PSN is available to be retrieved and by whom:
•	 BIOS: The manufacturer of the platform should provide users 
with an option in the BIOS configuration for disabling all software 
programs and websites to read PSN. Some BIOSes use enabled as 
the default value. This is a more advanced approach, because not 
all users know how to change BIOS configurations.
•	 Control utility: Intel released a Windows software program that 
lets end users configure the list of software programs and websites 
that are allowed to read PSN. The utility is a service that launches 
when Windows is booting. It is a convenient way for users of all 
skill levels to manage the exposure of the PSN.
Software or websites reading the PSN without the user’s consent pose privacy 
concerns. Opponents of the PSN expressed concerns about the design of the control 
mechanism. For example, some BIOSes may not offer an option for users to disable the 
PSN. Even if such an option is offered, if it is set to on by default, then some consumers 
may not know how to enter BIOS and change the configuration. Fortunately, besides 
using BIOS, a user can also turn off the PSN in Intel’s PSN control utility. However, 
the PSN may be read by software before the control utility is loaded and functional. 
Rogue software services that load before the control utility may read the PSN during 
the Windows boot process and save the value for later use, essentially bypassing the 
enforcement of the control utility. Furthermore, the control utility is software and may 
be hacked. Relying on software to protect hardware information that has implications on 
privacy is not a good security practice.
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So why was the PSN introduced in the first place? A number of applications may 
benefit from the PSN. Here are some examples:
•	 Secure authentication: Take website login, for example. 
Traditionally, a bank’s website only asks for the customer’s 
username and password as login credentials. This is called one-
factor authentication, where only one factor, namely, “something 
you know,” is required. If the password is acquired by an attacker, 
then he can successfully log in from his computer. To enhance 
the authentication security, the PSN can serve as another 
authentication factor, that is, “something you have.” To realize 
the two-factor authentication, the website checks the PSN of the 
computer in addition to the username and password. With the 
PSN enforcement, the attacker will not be able to log in from his 
computer even if he has stolen the victim’s password.
•	 Software piracy mitigation: During installation, software may save 
the PSN of the platform. At runtime, the software checks the PSN 
against the stored value and functions only if they match.
•	 Corporate computer management: The PSN makes the resource 
management tasks of corporates’ information technology (IT) 
departments easier. Replacing the processor on a computer is 
a much less frequent event than replacing other hardware and 
software components. Therefore, the constant PSN value allows 
the IT administrators to reliably identify individual platforms in 
the corporate network. The status of a platform can be monitored 
and tied to its processor PSN. Changes to the platform can be 
easily identified and managed.
Note that in the usages of secure authentication and software theft mitigation, the 
PSN protection may cause inconvenience to legitimate users. For example, if the user 
upgrades his processor, then he must re-register the new processor with all software 
vendors and websites that leverage the PSN, which could be cumbersome.
Admittedly, the PSN mechanism has its functional problems. For example, there is 
no infrastructure to support PSN revocation. If an attacker is able to steal the PSN of the 
victim’s processor and exploit other vulnerabilities in software or websites, then he can 
possibly circumvent the two-factor authentication and log in to the victim’s bank account.
However, the major concern of the PSN is privacy. Opponents argue that the 
mechanism for controlling the PSN access is not sufficiently robust to guarantee that the 
PSN is only available to software and websites that are explicitly allowed by the platform 
owner. In other words, unauthorized software or websites may be able to retrieve the PSN 
without the owner’s knowledge. Even for authorized entities, there is no governance or 
enforcement on how they use the PSN. For example, all Internet activities of a user may 
be traced by misbehaving software. Abusing the PSN would compromise privacy.
Intel cares about consumers’ privacy and has been dedicated to protecting it. 
In response to public’s concerns, Intel discontinued the PSN feature in its processor 
products after Pentium III.
But the general demand for hardware-protected authentication still exists. How to 
achieve it while safeguarding users’ privacy?
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EPID
One of the major achievements of Intel’s research effort in anonymous authentication is 
the enhanced privacy identification1 (EPID). The EPID is a novel technology that resolves 
all aspects of the active anonymity problem: authentication, anonymity, and revocation.
Mathematically, the EPID is built on finite field arithmetic and elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC). Interested readers should refer to the publications listed in the 
“References” section at the end of this chapter for mathematical details of the EPID.
The EPID ecosystem defines three entities:
•	 EPID authority: Responsible for generating EPID groups and 
private keys; also responsible for revoking members and 
groups. It has a root ECC key for signing group public keys, EPID 
predefined parameters, and revocation lists.
•	 Platform: Usually an end-consumer device that receives services.
•	 Verifier: Usually a service provider that provides premium services 
for the specific device.


























group public key, 
predefined parameters
Figure 5-1. Relationships among the three EPID entities
During the setup phase, the EPID authority provides private keys for all platforms, 
respectively. Note that every platform has a different and unique private key. The delivery 
and storage of the private key must be protected (encrypted) to avoid leakage. The EPID 
authority also establishes and manages a server for all verifiers to retrieve EPID group 
public keys and EPID parameters. These materials are not secrets, are digitally signed 
by the EPID authority, and therefore can be delivered through open networks. Because 
platforms served by the verifier may belong to different groups, the verifier must obtain 
all group public keys used by the clients it is serving beforehand from the EPID authority.
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In addition to the private key, the platform also needs the corresponding group 
public key and predefined parameters to generate EPID signatures. The group public key 
and parameters can be acquired from the EPID authority together with the private key or 
from a verifier.
Once the verifier and the platform are both provisioned with required information, 
the platform can sign messages or challenges from the verifier, and the verifier can verify 
whether the platform’s signature is acceptable.
Like all authentication mechanisms, the prover—in this case a platform—must 
possess a credential and show the verifier that it knows, has, or is the credential. On 
the other hand, the verifier—in this case the service provider—must have sufficient 
knowledge beforehand to reliably verify the correctness of the credential presented by 
the platform.
For example, in the simple password authentication scheme, the credential is the 
password. The platform must know and present the password. For verification, the 
verifier must have the expected password or a hash fingerprint of the expected password 
for comparison.
In the public key authentication scheme, the credential is the private key. The 
verifier sends a challenge to the platform, and the platform presents a digital signature 
generated using its private key and the challenge. The verifier must have the platform’s 
public key to verify the validity of the signature.
In two-factor authentication, the second factor is usually “something you have”—for 
example, a token device with a randomized PIN that is synchronized with the verifier’s 
server. The PSN on a Pentium III processor is also a form of “something you have”.
The credential can also be biological or “something you are,” such as fingerprint 
or eyeball characteristics. For example, Apple’s iPhone 5s features fingerprint 
authentication.
None of these authentication schemes is anonymous. The verifier identifies the 
platform with the presented unique credential.
Similar to traditional public key cryptography, an EPID platform owns a unique 
private key and must keep it secret (protecting with confidentiality). Both the EPID 
platform and the EPID verifier know the group public key and must maintain its integrity.
Here’s what is not so similar to traditional public key cryptography:
An EPID private key is essentially derived from a random number. •	
The ECC private key is also a random number; but an RSA private 
key set is not random but a probable prime number. The key 
generation for EPID is thus faster than RSA.
An EPID private key has one corresponding EPID public key—the •	
group public key. However, a group public key corresponds to 
multiple EPID private keys. The number of private keys that map 
to the same group public key is configurable; it can be as few as 
several hundred or as many as tens of millions. Obviously, a group 
with more members, in theory, features better anonymity and 
offers more privacy. However, as described later in this chapter, 
under certain circumstances the computational cost will increase 
linearly with the increase of members in a group.
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Intel’s security and management engine is the first platform that implements EPID. 
Intel’s chipset series 5 (released in 2008) and newer natively support the EPID platform 
functionality. A unique private key, in its encrypted form, is burned into security fuses for 
every chipset part during manufacturing.
For this EPID ecosystem, Intel acts as the EPID authority. Using the private key, the 
security and management engine proves that it is a genuine Intel platform, and hence 
eligible for premium services that are only available for Intel platforms.
 Key Structures and Provisioning
The platform device must have built-in secure storage capability—at a minimum, 
encryption, for storing the EPID private key. Integrity and anti-reply protections for the 
private key storage are optional but recommended. If integrity or anti-reply is absent, 
attackers may be able to mount denial of service (DoS) attacks against the platform 
device, so services relying on EPID may not be available when requested.
For EPID version 1.1, a private key is 1312 bits in size. Its components include:
Group ID (32 bits)•	
•	 A: An element in a predefined 512-bit elliptic curve group G1  
(512 bits)
•	 x: An integer ranging from 0 to p – 1 inclusive, where p is the 
parameter of G1 (256 bits)
•	 y: An integer ranging from 0 to p – 1 inclusive (256 bits)
•	 f: An integer ranging from 0 to p – 1 inclusive (256 bits)
To save space, an EPID private key can also be expressed in the compressed form, 
which is 544 bits in size:
Group ID (32 bits)•	
•	 A.x: An integer ranging from 0 to q – 1 inclusive, where q is the 
parameter of G1 (256 bits)
•	 Seed: A 256-bit string
The compressed form of a private key must be decompressed before being used for 
signing. The complete private key can be derived from its compressed form, together with 
the group’s public key and values of all predefined elements such as G1.
On Intel’s security and management engine, the EPID key is treated as an asset of 
the highest value on the engine. On Intel’s manufacturing line, an EPID key, in its 544-bit 
compressed and encrypted form, is retrieved from Intel EPID authority’s secure server 
that generated all keys. The manufacturing process then burns the 544-bit key to secure 
fuses of the engine. For security and privacy reasons, the key is then immediately and 
permanently deleted from the secure server. In other words, from that point on, only the 
part itself knows the value of its EPID private key. As the key is deleted after being burned 
to fuses, there is no “key retrieval” mechanism. If the part loses its EPID private key, it has 
to be returned to the Intel factory, and a new EPID private key has to be provisioned to it.
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On Intel’s security and management engine, because what the fuses store is the 
compressed form of the private key, EPID is not immediately available for use out of box.  
To save expensive fuse space, the group public key is not burned to individual platforms.  
In order to function as a platform, a procedure called “provisioning” must be executed first. 
The provisioning is a one-time effort for the life of a platform. During provisioning, the group 
public key and predefined parameters of EPID are sent to the platform from a verifier. The 
platform uses this data together with its compressed private key to derive the complete private 
key and then stores the complete private key in secure storage for use in future EPID sessions.
The provisioning must be done before the first invocation of the EPID on a platform. 
Many platform manufacturers choose to provision in their manufacturing lines for better 
user experience. Others perform provisioning during system initialization on the first 
boot. The verifier can be software running on a host operating system or a remote server. 
Figure 5-2 depicts the provisioning protocol.
Platform Verifier
No
Are you provisioned yet?




1. Verify EPID authority’s ECC signature.
2. Decompress private key
3. Store decompressed private key in secure storage
4. Store group public key and predefined parameters
Provisioning completed
Figure 5-2. EPID provisioning protocol
The EPID algorithm uses four mathematical groups: G1, G2, G3, and GT. The groups 
G1, G2, and G3 are elliptic curve groups. The group GT is a finite field group.
G1 is 512-bit in size. An element of G1 takes the format of (•	 x, y) 
where x and y are big integers ranging from 0 to q – 1 inclusive.
G2 is 1536-bit in size. An element of G2 takes the format of  •	
(x[0], x[1], x[2], y[0], y[1], y[2]), where x[i] and y[i] are big integers 
ranging from 0 to q – 1 inclusive.
G3 is 512-bit in size. An element of G3 takes the format of (•	 x, y) 
where x and y are big integers ranging from 0 to q – 1 inclusive.
GT is 1536-bit in size. An element of GT takes the format of  •	
(x[0], x[1], ..., x[5]), where x[i] is a big integer ranging from 0 to  
q – 1 inclusive.
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All EPID groups share the same predefined parameters for G1, G2, G3, and GT. These 
groups are defined by the following parameters:
Elliptic curve group G1. Parameters:•	
 · p (256-bit), a prime
 · q (256-bit), a prime
 · h (32-bit), a small integer, also denoted as cofactor
 · a (256-bit), an integer ranging from 0 to q – 1 inclusive
 · b (256-bit), an integer ranging from 0 to q – 1 inclusive
 · g1 (512-bit), a generator (an element) of G1
Elliptic curve group G2. Parameters:•	
 · p (256-bit), same as in G1
 · q (256-bit), same as in G1
 · a (256-bit), same as in G1
 · b (256-bit), same as in G1
coeff (768-bit), the coefficients of an irreducible polynomial ·
coeff[0], coeff[1], coeff[2]: 256-bit integers ranging from 0 to  ·
q – 1 inclusive
 · qnr (256-bit), a quadratic nonresidue (an integer ranging 
from 0 to q – 1 inclusive)
orderG2 (768-bit), the total number of points in G2 elliptic  ·
curve
 · g2 (1536-bit), a generator (an element) of G2
Elliptic curve group G3. Parameters:•	
 · p´ (256-bit), a prime
 · q´ (256-bit), a prime
 · h´ (32-bit), a small integer, usually 1, also denoted as 
cofactor’
 · a´ (256-bit), an integer between ranging from 0 to q´ – 1 
inclusive
 · b´ (256-bit), an integer between ranging from 0 to q´ – 1 
inclusive
 · g3 (512-bit), a generator (an element) of G3
Chapter 5 ■ privaCy at the Next LeveL: iNteL’s eNhaNCed privaCy ideNtifiCatioN (epid) teChNoLogy
127
Finite field group GT. Parameters:•	
 · q (256-bit), same as in G1
coeff (768-bit), same as in G2 ·
 · qnr (256-bit), same as in G2
The public key of an EPID group consists of the following elements:
Group ID (32 bits)•	
•	 h1 (512 bits): An element in G1
•	 h2 (512 bits): An element in G1
•	 w (1536 bits): An element in a predefined 1536-bit elliptic curve 
group G2
Although the group public key and predefined parameters are not secrets, the 
platform must verify that what is sent by the verifier is trustworthy. The EPID group 
pubic key and the predefined parameters are digitally signed by the EPID authority using 
ECDSA.2  The EPID authority’s ECC public key is hardcoded in all platform devices. The 
platform verifies the EPID authority’s ECDSA signature before using the data sent by the 
verifiers to perform the private key decompression.
If the platform device has enough fuse space, the manufacturing process can 
provision public key and predefined parameters together with private keys for the 
devices, in which case the provisioning protocol can be skipped. However, because the 
provisioning is a one-time procedure for the lifetime of the device, and the public key and 
predefined parameter are not secrets, it is generally preferable to burn only the private 
key during manufacturing and perform provisioning before the first use of EPID. This is 
the design used by Intel’s security and management engine to save secure fuse space.
Notice that even if a platform provisions the group public key, predefined 
parameters, and the private key during manufacturing, it must hardcode the ECDSA root 
public key of the EPID authority for verifying the verifier’s signature in a SIGMA session. 
See the “SIGMA” section of this chapter for details.
Revocation
The EPID protocol supports revocation of members or groups. How is a platform 
identified for revocation? In an EPID ecosystem, the EPID authority is the only entity that 
has the privilege to revoke a member or a group. Once a verifier identifies a platform or 
group that should be revoked, it notifies the EPID authority with reasons. The authority 
then examines the request and executes corresponding revocation operations if the 
request is deemed legitimate. In certain cases, the EPID authority may decide to revoke 
platforms or groups without requests from verifiers.
Depending on what information is known about the entity to be revoked, a 
revocation request may belong to any one of three categories: private key-based 
revocation, signature-based revocation, or group-based revocation. The EPID authority 
maintains a single group revocation list (GROUP-RL), and for each group that is not on 
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the group-based revocation list, it maintains a private key-based revocation (PRIV-RL) list 
and a signature-based revocation list (SIG-RL). The revocation lists are centrally managed 
and pushed to all verifiers of the ecosystem.
Private Key-Based Revocation
If a member’s private key is proved to be possessed by any party other than the platform 
device itself—for example, if a valid private key is published on the Internet—then the 
platform device is concluded as having been compromised, and it should not receive 
any more services as an EPID platform. In order to revoke a member by using its private 
key, the EPID authority must acquire the value of the private key (in either compressed 
or complete form). The private key-based revocation can be initiated by a verifier or the 
EPID authority. Figure 5-3 shows the flows exercised by the EPID authority for revoking a 
private key.
About to revoke
private key k of
group x




Add k to PRIV-RL
of group x
End
Is k the generator of any






RL of group x
Figure 5-3. Placing a private key in the PRIV-RL
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Consider a real-world scenario: the owner of a platform breaks into the device by 
exploiting critical vulnerability of the hardware or firmware and manages to extract the 
EPID private key from the device. He then shares the private key with other people so 
they can all enjoy services without having to buy the platform device or pay the service 
provider. If the provider uses the “base name” option (described later in this chapter), 
then it can detect such abuse and revoke the private key.
It is possible that the platform to be revoked using private key-based revocation has 
already been revoked by the signature-based revocation. To minimize the sizes of SIG-RL, 
before adding a private key to the PRIV-RL, the EPID authority first goes through the  
SIG-RL and checks if any revoked signatures in the SIG-RL were generated by this key. 
Such signatures, if any, are removed from the SIG-RL.
Signature-Based Revocation 
If a member has reportedly been misbehaving, but its private key is not yet exposed 
or known by the EPID authority, then the EPID authority may revoke the member by 
identifying it using a signature the member had previously generated. Misbehaviors are 
defined by the verifiers and the EPID authority. For example, a platform continuously 
making excessive requests may be considered to be misbehaving; a platform that 
repeatedly generates a constant signature for the same challenge is likely compromised, 
because per the EPID algorithm, multiple signatures generated for the same challenge 
should be different.
The EPID signature allows the verifier to enforce an optional “based name” 
parameter so that all signatures generated by the same platform are linkable. The verifier 
can utilize this option to detect and identify malicious users that abuse anonymity and 
revoke them using the signature-based revocation mechanism.
The private key-based revocation has higher priority than the signature-based 
revocation. When the EPID authority receives a signature revocation request from a 
verifier, it first checks the signature against all entries in the private key-based revocation 
list. If the signature was generated by a revoked private key, then it will not be placed in 
the signature-based revocation list.
Note ■  although a useful feature, the signature revocation is computationally expensive 
for both the signature generation of all platforms of this group (even if a platform is not the 
one that was revoked) and the verifier’s signature verification, and it increases protocol  
traffic between the two parties. also notice that one revoked member may have more than 
one signature presented in the signature revocation list.
Figure 5-4 exhibits the flows exercised by the EPID authority for revoking a signature.
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Group-Based Revocation 
This is the mechanism to revoke all members of a group. The reason for revoking the 
entire group could include termination of the service contract for a group of members, or 
performance—when too many members of a group have been revoked using signature 
revocation, the signing and verifying operations can take a very long time. At a certain 
point, the EPID authority can decide to revoke the group and create a new group.
Another scenario that applies to the group-based revocation is when critical 
vulnerability in platform implementation is found by the device manufacturer, but the 
vulnerability has not been exposed or exploited publicly. The vulnerability is critical 
because it may lead to compromise of the EPID private key. In this case, the platform 
manufacturer should not only push a patch that fixes the critical vulnerability to all 
impacted devices, but also revoke these devices using the group-based revocation.
If the group-based revocation is due to performance or platform vulnerability, then 
the EPID authority will create a new group and reprovision nonrevoked members of the 
old group. Of course, a member of the old group must show that it has not been revoked 
by private key and signature, in order to receive a new private key of the new group.
The group-based revocation has highest priority among the three revocation 
methods. Once a group is revoked, its SIG-RL and PRIV-RL will not be used by verifiers. 
The EPID authority does not maintain SIG-RL or PRIV-RL for revoked groups.









Is s generated by any entry
in the PRIV-RL of group x?
Yes
No Add s to SIG-RL of
group x
Figure 5-4. Placing a signature in the SIG-RL
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Signature Generation and Verification
The EPID signature generation is the algorithm implemented by a platform. The EPID 
signature verification is the algorithm implemented by a verifier. This section gives an 
interface overview of the two algorithms but does not discuss mathematical details. Readers 
interested in the detailed steps of the signature generation and verification algorithms 
should refer to publications listed on the “Reference” section at the end of this chapter.
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Yes Delete SIG-RL of
group x
Figure 5-5. Placing a group in the GROUP-RL





Corresponding EPID group public key•	
Message to be signed•	
Verifier’s base name (optional)•	
Signature revocation list of this group•	
Output:
Basic EPID signature•	
Non-revocation proofs, one for each entry in the signature •	
revocation list
The basic signature generation is a very intensive operation—it takes as long as 
two seconds on the security and management engine, which negatively impacts the 
user’s experience. Fortunately, most of the steps of the basic signature generation can be 
performed without the knowledge of the message to be signed.
The “pregenerating and caching” optimization is utilized widely in the security 
and management engine by many applications to expedite real-time operation. For the 
EPID, the engine creates and caches a certain number of “presignatures” without using 
the message to be signed. The presignatures are stored securely in the engine’s internal 
memory. The presignature generation is performed right after every time the engine 
is powered on. Alternatively, the unused presignatures in the cache can be stored in 
nonvolatile memory before power-off, and loaded and reused at the next power-on. Due 
to the very limited storage space and large size of the presignatures, the first option is 
deemed more efficient for the engine.
When a signing request is received, the engine fetches a presignature from the cache 
and completes the final signature using the message from the verifier. The engine then 












(only when there is update to lists)
Figure 5-6. EPID signature generation and verification
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the presignature cache. Experiments show that the presignature generation contributes 
to about 95% of total basic signature generation time. In other words, the caching 
optimization reduces the EPID signing time by about 95%.
In addition to the basic EPID signature, the platform has to generate a non-
revocation proof for every signature in the SIG-RL. The data transmission and 
computation time become noticeably long as the number of entries in the SIG-RL 
increases. Unfortunately, the non-revocation proof cannot be precomputed because the 
calculation uses the basic EPID signature as input.
If the platform’s private key was used to generate at least one signature on the 
SOG-RL, then the non-revocation proof calculation will fail, and the platform, if not 
compromised, should abort and notify the verifier of the revocation of itself. Even if 
the platform is malicious and returns an invalid non-revocation proof for the revoked 
signature, the verifier will be able to detect it because the signature verification will fail.
Base Name
The base name is an optional input to the signature generation and verification 
algorithms. It is the verifier that decides whether to require it or not. The platform has 
the right to deny using a base name. If used, all signatures generated by a platform with 
the verifier’s base name are linkable to the verifier. That is, the verifier is able to identity 
which signatures come from the same platform. The verifier cannot tell which platform it 
is, though.
Apparently, this option degrades the privacy protection for the platform. Therefore, 
the design guideline for the platform is to reject signature requests with base name by 
default and only use a base name with trusted verifiers. The platform should hardcode 
a list of trusted verifiers. The SIGMA protocol, introduced in the next section, provides a 
way to identify the verifier.
But why does a verifier want to use the base name option? The main reason is to 
prevent rogue platform users from abusing the anonymity of EPID. Consider a scenario 
where an online movie subscription service sets a limit of 100 movies per month. The 
base name signature can help the service provider keep track of usage for all platform 
subscribers, identify excessive usages, and revoke rogue platforms if necessary.
Signature Verification
Input:
EPID group public key•	
Private key revocation list•	
Signature revocation list•	
Group revocation list•	
Message that was signed•	
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Signature valid or invalid•	
As shown in the input and output parameter lists, the amount of data transmitted 
between the platform and the verifier for signature revocation is proportional to the 
number of entries in the signature revocation list. This is because the verifier must send 
all signatures in the SIG-RL to the platform, and the platform must prove that it is not the 
generator of any signature in the list.
A lengthy SIG-RL is not only affecting the volume of data transmission, but also 
increasing the computational cost. The platform must calculate a non-revocation proof 
for each revoked signature; the verifier must verify the validity of each non-revocation 
proof sent by the platform.
For Intel’s EPID ecosystem, the threshold for the number of entries in the signature 
revocation list of a group is set to 50 and enforced by Intel’s EPID authority. The number 
was chosen based on performance measurement of the security and management 
engine, and the capacity and bandwidth of the communication channel between the 
engine and the verifier host software or the remote verifier server. When the number 
of revoked signatures exceeds 50, the group will be revoked, and a new group will be 
assigned to replace the old group.
The verifier must validate the platform against all three revocation lists, in the 
following order:
Is the platform’s group ID in the group-based revocation list? If •	
so, abort.
Is the platform’s basic signature generated by any private key in •	
the private key-based revocation list? If so, abort.
Are the platform’s non-revocation proofs valid against all entries •	
in the signature-based revocation list? If not, abort. The signature 
revocation is checked last because its operation is much slower 
than the other two revocations.
The signature verification is also a mathematically intensive operation. 
Because the verifier usually is equipped with strong computational capability 
(faster CPU and more memory), though, it does not introduce significant latency 
from an end user’s perspective.
SIGMA
The EPID provides a solution for a platform to authenticate itself anonymously to a 
verifier. The EPID is a one-way authentication protocol, because the verifier is not 
authenticating to the platform. However, for many use cases, the platform has to identify 
and trust the verifier.
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One application of the security and management engine was the Intel Upgrade 
Servicei that allowed customers to enable advanced CPU features by purchasing a $50 
upgrade card. In this usage model, the engine is the EPID platform, and a remote server 
set up by Intel is the verifier.
On the one hand, the remote server must be assured that the target platform is 
indeed an eligible Intel security and management engine. On the other hand, the engine 
must verify that the upgrade request indeed came from a legitimate Intel server after 
payment was cleared, and not from a hacker’s forgery. Notice that in this case there is no 
privacy requirement on the verifier. So the authentication method of this direction can be 
realized by traditional public key cryptography.
In addition to mutual authentication for each other, the platform and the verifier 
have to perform further secure message exchanges for application-specific protocols.  
The EPID algorithm per se does not establish session keys for encryption or integrity.
On top of EPID, ECDSA, and the Diffie-Hellman3 key exchange scheme, Intel 
designed a protocol called SIGMA (SIGn and Message Authentication) that enables  
two-way authentication, one direction anonymously and the other distinctively, as well as 
session key agreement. The security and management engine implements the platform 
side of the SIGMA protocol.
Verifier’s Certificate 
The SIGMA protocol is built on a public key infrastructure (PKI). In this PKI, the EPID 
authority also serves as the root CA (certification authority) of verifiers and issues X.509 
certificates to qualified verifier applications. For example, a DAL (dynamic application loader; 
see Chapter 9) applet that invokes EPID on the security and management engine should 
obtain its verifier certificate chain rooted to the Intel EPID authority CA. The server for the 
Intel Upgrade Service obtained its X.509 verifier certificate from the EPID authority as well.
As the root CA, the EPID authority may issue a leaf certificate for a verifier program 
or issue intermediate CA certificates, which then sign and issue other intermediate CA 
certificates or verifier certificates. Nevertheless, the verifier’s certificate chain must be 
rooted to the self-signed certificate of the EPID authority. Recall that the platform device 
with compressed private key must hardcode the EPID authority’s root ECDSA public 
key for verifying the EPID group public key and predefined EPID parameters sent from 
the verifier. The same ECDSA public key is also used by the platforms to validate the 
certificate chain of the verifier.
The SIGMA PKI supports revocation of the verifier. When a verifier is no longer 
qualified as an EPID verifier, and its X.509 certificate has not yet expired, then its 
certificate can be revoked by the EPID authority. The criteria of a qualified verifier are 
defined by and at the discretion of the EPID authority. For example, upon end of life, the 
certificate of Intel Upgrade Service was revoked.
One or more online certificate status protocol (OCSP) servers are employed to 
enforce the revocation. The EPID authority issues X.509 certificates to OCSP servers. 
The EPID authority pushes the revocation lists of intermediate CAs and/or verifiers to all 
OCSP servers whenever new certificates are revoked.
iIntel Upgrade Service was end-of-life in 2011 and no longer available to customers.
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Upon request, the authorized OCSP servers issue signed non-revocation proofs for 
all intermediate CA certificates and verifier certificates to the requesting verifiers. The 
non-revocation proofs include timestamps that will be used by the platform. The verifier 
can then present the non-revocation proofs together with its certificate chain to the 
EPID platform.
As an embedded system, the security and management engine does not have convenient 
network access. Therefore, the SIGMA protocol is designed such that the platform does not 
communicate with the OCSP server directly but only connects with the verifier.
Let’s summarize all materials signed by the EPID authority’s root ECDSA key:
EPID group certificates that contain group public keys•	
EPID predefined parameters•	
Verifier’s certificates and intermediate CAs’ certificates•	
OCSP servers’ certificates•	
Messages Breakdown
A high-level overview of the SIGMA protocol is given in Figure 5-7. Detailed 
descriptions follow.
Platform Verifier OCSP
GroupId, OCSP challenge, aG
OCSP challenge
OCSP response
X.509 cert chain, OCSP response, SIG-RL, bG
HMAC, ECC sig(aG || bG )







Figure 5-7. SIGMA protocol
To begin a SIGMA session, the platform randomly generates an elliptic curve  
Diffie-Hellman private key a and calculates public key a·G. The base point G is predefined 
by the EPID authority. The verifier similarly generates b and calculates b·G.
In M1, the platform sends its EPID group ID and Diffie-Hellman pubic key a·G to the 
verifier. The group ID is for the verifier to look up and send back corresponding SIG-RL 
for that group in M4.
Under certain cases, the platform can also send a random OCSP challenge in M1,  
if it wants to receive a real-time “noncached” OCSP response (non-revocation proof).  
If an OCSP challenge is not sent, then the verifier is allowed to provide a “cached” OCSP 
response that was previously generated by the OCSP server. It is up to the platform 
implementation to decide the maximum age of a cached OCSP response that is 
considered acceptable. The security and management engine accepts an OCSP response 
that was generated within the last 24 hours. In other words, the verifier program may 
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vulnerably retrieve a non-revocation proof from the OCSP server every 24 hours, for 
example at midnight. In the case of a cached OCSP response, the challenge is not material 
and will not be checked by the platform.
Obviously, if the platform decides to request for a noncached OCSP response, the 
SIGMA session will take significantly longer because the platform has to communicate 
with the OCSP server via the verifier during the SIGMA session (messages M2 and M3). 
If the platform accepts cached OCSP response, then M2 and M3 can be skipped. Another 
more problematic scenario with noncached OCSP response is when the OCSP server is 
temporally unavailable or unreachable by the verifier, in which case the SIGMA session 
has to be aborted, resulting in a poor user experience.
So under what conditions should a platform request a noncached OCSP response? 
The answer is application specific. Intel’s security and management engine requests for 
noncached OCSP responses only when
•	 The engine has not been provisioned date/time yet. As a platform, 
the engine must have the current date/time to confirm validity 
periods of verifiers’ X.509 certificates and other PKI elements. If 
the engine has no date/time information, then it has to ask for a 
noncached OCSP response and use the timestamp in the OCSP 
response as the current date/time. The engine’s kernel has a 
secure clocking capability (refer to Chapter 3 for details) and will 
maintain the trusted date/time, even if the device is powered off.
•	 The date/time was provisioned more than 30 days ago. Every 30 
days, the engine requests for a noncached OCSP response to 
calibrate its date/time. This eliminates the influences of possible 
glitches of the internal clock.
M4 is a heavily loaded message that deserves more attention. M4 contains the following:
•	 M4.1: Verifier’s Diffie-Hellman public key b·G
•	 M4.2: SIG-RL
•	 M4.3: Verifier’s X.509 certificate chain
•	 M4.4: OCSP response
•	 M4.5: HMAC on M4.1 to M4.4
•	 M4.6: Verifier’s ECDSA signature on a·G || b·G
Before sending M4, the verifier uses its ECC private key to sign “a·G concatenated 
with b·G.” It also derives the Diffie-Hellman shared secret s from b and a·G. The HMAC on 
M4.1 to M4.4 are calculated using s.
The platform verifies validity of the certificate chain and the OCSP response, 
including checking the nonce if it is noncached, and then verifies the ECC signature. The 
platform then calculates the Diffie-Hellman shared secret s from a and b·G and verifies 
the HMAC. Once everything checks out, the platform proceeds with EPID signature 
generation on message b·G || a·G, and sends to the verifier in M5 with a·G. a·G is sent 
again in M5, so the verifier is able to match the a·G values in M1 and M5 and confirm they 
belong to the same SIGMA session, when there are multiple concurrent SIGMA sessions.
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After the verifier verifies the platform’s EPID signature (including non-revocation 
proofs) that has been sent in M5, the two parties have completed mutual authentication 
and session key agreement. The subsequent messages between the platform and the 
verifier are application specific. Derived values from the shared secret s are used as an 
encryption key and an HMAC key, respectively, to safeguard the application-specific 
communication.
The lifetime of a SIGMA session is determined by the platform and the verifier. 
Though a maximum lifetime does not have to be enforced, it is recommended that 
a new SIGMA session be established periodically. For performance considerations, 
a SIGMA session should not be renewed too frequently, because EPID is a relatively 
slow algorithm.
Implementation of EPID 
This section discusses the best-known methods for implementing EPID infrastructure.
Key Recovery
Due to its nature of anonymity, the EPID must be a native built-in functionality of 
the device. The EPID private keys should be provisioned to platform devices during 
manufacturing, instead of in the field. This is because as soon as a consumer purchases 
the device, the device is associated to the consumer and is no longer anonymous. Any key 
provisioning in the field would have to involve the device owner’s identity and actions; for 
example, using a credit card to purchase an EPID-based service.
Reprovisioning an EPID private key requires a “super verifier” that has access to 
the EPID key generation server; hence the super verifier must be set up by the EPID 
authority. During a SIGMA session, if a verifier finds that the platform’s group is revoked, 
then it should direct the platform to the super verifier and the platform should check 
whether EPID reprovisioning is available for this platform.
As briefly discussed earlier, Intel’s security and management engine supports 
reprovision of EPID private key in the field for one of the following two reasons:
Performance due to too many signatures revoked by the •	
signature-based revocation
Critical vulnerability in firmware•	
In the first case, the platform presents a signature generated using its current 
EPID private key in a SIGMA session with the super verifier. Once the SIGMA session 
is established, the super verifier will send the new group ID and a complete private key 
to the platform. The platform then replaces the old key with the new key in its secure 
nonvolatile storage.
The second case is more complicated. If vulnerability is found in firmware that may 
leak the EPID private key, and there is no known exploit against the vulnerability yet, 
then the manufacturer should release a firmware hotfix and push the firmware update 
to all platforms that have the vulnerability. In the SIGMA session (established using the 
old private key from the platform’s perspective), the super verifier must first confirm 
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the platform has the latest firmware installed, and then send a new private key to the 
platform. From then on, the old private key is obsoleted, and the platform must use the 
new EPID key in all future SIGMA sessions.
Note ■  the firmware hotfix must also replace the secret keys that are used to protect 
nonvolatile files.
It is always tricky and costly to deal with consequences of critical bugs found in 
released products. For some cases, a recovery may not be an ideal solution. For example, 
if there were already published exploits against the vulnerability, then those rogue end 
users that had exercised the exploit and retrieved the private keys would be eligible for 
reprovision with a new private key and continue to enjoy premium services that they were 
not supposed to receive.
If the vulnerability also allowed compromised firmware to cheat the super verifier 
by sending an arbitrary firmware version number in the SIGMA session, then the super 
verifier would happily send the new private key to the vulnerable firmware.
Attack Mitigation
Like all cryptography protocols, attackers target two aspects: algorithm and 
implementation. To date, there are no known attacks against the EPID algorithm.
To protect an asset, the requirement of the implementation is to make the cost of 
successful attacks higher than the value of the asset. If an asset can be compromised 
on one device and used on all devices (BORE attack), then it is a high-value asset and 
must be afforded the strongest protection. For example, global keys that are stored in 
all devices fall into this category. On the other hand, device-specific secrets are of less 
value than global secrets. The attack must be repeated on an individual device to retrieve 
the secret from the device. This is impractical, especially if the attack requires special 
hardware, setup, and expertise to mount.
The EPID private key is a highly valuable asset because it grants access to premium 
services offered exclusively to the platform. The implementation of the security and 
management engine attempts to ensure that the EPID key cannot be revealed from a 
device without special and expensive equipment and advanced expertise in hacking. The 
following mechanisms to protect EPID private keys are applied:
The EPID keys in fuses are in encrypted form.•	
Anti-cloning: The decompressed private key is stored in secure •	
nonvolatile storage and protected with AES for encryption and 
HMAC-SHA-256 for integrity. The AES and HMAC keys are 
unique per part. Therefore, copying the EPID key file on the flash 
from one part to another will not work.
At runtime, the EPID key is handled in the engine’s internal •	
memory and is never exposed in the clear to the host.
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Applications of EPID 
The services and applications that are built on the EPID always have dependency on 
certain features of the device. Intel’s security and management engine features premium 
applications that are only available on the engine and should not be executed by other 
products. These features require specific hardware and/or environment support to 
function. The EPID is used to prove it is a genuine Intel platform with such support and is 
eligible to enjoy the premium services, but not which individual Intel platform.
Examples of such premium services include:
•	 Intel upgrade service: Consumers could purchase an upgrade 
code from Intel and unlock advanced CPU features. This was the 
first application of EPID, which was dropped in 2011.
•	 Anti-theft technology: Shut down a mobile device when the owner 
reports it as stolen.
•	 Premium content playback: Intel platforms feature proprietary 
PAVP (protected audio video path) technology that offers robust 
hardware protection for contents (see Chapter 8 for details). 
Once a platform is authenticated via EPID to be a genuine 
Intel platform, the user can enjoy premium contents (such as 
high-definition movies) that are only allowed, as required by 
the content creators, on platforms with hardware-level content 
protection.
•	 Identity protection technology: Intel’s identity protection 
technology4 provides a simple and tamper-resistant method for 
protecting access to customer and business data from threats and 
fraud. EPID is used to authenticate the Intel platform.
Next Generation of EPID
Intel continues working on improving the EPID scheme and exploring new deployments 
for the EPID.
Two-way EPID
The two ways in SIGMA’s two-way authentication are not equal—one direction is 
anonymous, and the other is not. As more applications deploy EPID, it is likely that for 
some applications, both sides of the protocol must remain anonymous. In that case, both 
parties will implement platform and verifier functionalities, and two EPID sessions must 
be established to realize mutual anonymous authentication.
Chapter 5 ■ privaCy at the Next LeveL: iNteL’s eNhaNCed privaCy ideNtifiCatioN (epid) teChNoLogy
141
Optimization
Intel’s chipset series 5, 6, 7, and 8 and Bay Trail systems-on-chip products feature the 
second version of EPID: EPID 1.1. The sizes of its elements (keys, parameters, signature, 
revocation lists, and so forth) are not small. The algorithms require a relatively large 
amount of computational resources.
Performance, memory consumption, storage space, and power consumption are 
all critical measures for mobile devices. The new EPID 2.0 standard strives to reduce 
computational cost by choosing more efficient curves and reducing key sizes while 
maintaining the same security level. The EPID 2.0 is published as ISO/IEC standard 20008.5
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